Women’s Struggle to Escape Rural Poverty in South Africa

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Results of a purposive sample of the poorest are contrasted with the methods and conclusions of other research into ‘income poverty’. The deprivation suffered by an important class of rural women in South Africa is documented. Escape routes from poverty are described that have a more realistic prospect of success than those promoted in the international and South African policy literature, including the literature on land reform. The distinguishing demographic characteristics of women who have taken the first steps on these routes are analysed, together with the political context of their relative success. Escaping the worst forms of deprivation depends on women’s wages in rural labour markets, rather than their incomes from self-employment, but conventional microeconomic theory cannot explain the distribution of wages in these markets. The South African government has been unduly influenced by such conventional theories and the rhetoric of the development aid bureaucracy. It is failing to consider policies that are relevant to the poorest people.

Keywords: women, poverty, wages, employment, education, rural

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s several young men and women, who had grown up in the extremely harsh conditions of Soweto and other Johannesburg townships, participated in the fieldwork that is the basis for this article.¹ After spending some time in the one-roomed homes and talking to the occupants who were struggling...
to survive as farm labourers, their reactions were interesting and unexpected. They were visibly shocked and outraged. They all said that they had no idea that large numbers of women still lived in such appalling conditions in South Africa in the 1990s, without a stick of furniture or even a pair of shoes to call their own. They found it hard to believe that so many of their children had died, that so few of them could read or write, and that so many women and children were being forced to accept poverty wages and oppressive working conditions.

One aim of this article is to document in some detail the degree and nature of the deprivation suffered by an important group of rural women in South Africa. The hope is that the views currently held by many young, urban black South Africans (and others) concerning the prospects faced by rural women will become clearer, and less clouded by the bias and inaccuracies that have been a feature of too much of the policy debate and the academic literature on poverty. This literature, and also some of the policy conclusions drawn from recent research on poverty that is loosely based on American-funded ‘representative’ household income and expenditure surveys, are criticized throughout the article. In particular, the internationally fashionable conclusion that poor women can hope to survive by relying on self-employment, especially self-employment as crop or livestock producers, is critically examined through an analysis of the sources of income that are available to the poor in rural South Africa.

Wherever possible, the methodological advantages and the results of a large-scale purposive sample of the poorest rural women are contrasted with the methods and conclusions of other research into ‘income poverty’ in South Africa. However, the results of the survey research proved to be useful not only as a stick with which to beat some of the usual accounts and measures of rural poverty; the data also led to some unexpected conclusions concerning the dynamics of the struggles of a specific gender and class. One obvious problem faced by all research into the dynamics of poverty in South Africa, in common with many other developing economies, is the absence of panel data or longitudinal micro-surveys that could be used as a guide to a more realistic understanding of feasible trajectories of escape from poverty as capitalism develops. The survey data make it possible to tackle this problem in two stages.

First, it is shown that despite the poverty, on average, of the purposively surveyed women relative to the South Africans covered by other research, some of these women live in households where standards of living are much less degraded than the sample average, and their children are much more likely to survive and acquire an education. The second stage, therefore, is to examine in detail the reasons for their relative success, as a guide to the first steps on an escape route from poverty that may have a more realistic prospect of success in the future than those identified in current policy debates. Thus, the penultimate section focuses on possible escape routes from poverty, building on the preceding discussion of the heterogeneity of the poor.

Following an extended analysis of the contribution that men may have made to the success/failure of rural households, ‘De-linking from Men’ concludes by emphasizing the role played in the struggle to avoid the most acute forms of
deprivation by the wage earnings of the most successful women in the agricultural labour market. The distinguishing demographic characteristics of these women are next identified and some of the tools of political economy are used to analyse the broader context within which their success has been achieved. This context is one in which employer strategies and state policies discriminate against other, much less successful women who are participating in the unskilled agricultural labour market. At the start of ‘The Women Who Get Better Jobs’, it is also argued that orthodox microeconomic theory cannot usefully be applied in the context of these labour markets.

The final part of this article provides a brief discussion of the barriers that appear to be blocking escape routes for the poorest women. It is suggested that the ANC-led government is failing to consider those policy initiatives that might be effective in removing, or at least lowering, some of these barriers. It has, instead, echoed much of the analyses and adopted the rhetoric of the international aid bureaucracy. The article concludes with some critical comments concerning the relevance of the government’s land reform programme.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MPUMALANGA SAMPLE

The Location and Size of the Sample

The Mpumalanga sample was interviewed over the period 1992–1994. The area of South Africa covered by the survey is shown in Figure 1. Information was collected from female respondents who were members of a large population of rural women with some experience of agricultural wage labour on different types of farm. Mpumalanga provides an excellent context for such a survey, because of the scale of wage labour on forest plantations, as well as on capitalist fruit and horticultural farms in the lowveld. Another survey, covering a randomly selected and much larger group of households in the Mpumalanga area, suggests that at least 44,000 households in Gazankulu and Lebowa rely on the incomes earned by female agricultural wage labourers.2

The respondents provided information on 2374 adults (15 years of age or older) and on 1893 children (14 years of age or younger). Children and adults were defined as members of a ‘household’ on the basis of criteria that differ from those used in most rural surveys in Africa. The aim was to focus on the economic, as opposed to the kinship or residential ties that are important for the survival of poor rural people. Residential arrangements in Mpumalanga, as in many other poor rural areas of Southern Africa, are extremely fluid and complex; men, women and children spend differing amounts of time eating and sleeping in dwellings scattered over wide distances (James 1993; Kotzé 1993, ch. 3; Niehaus 1994; Ritchken 1995, 360; Breslin and Delius 1996; Van der Waal

2 The results of this survey, which support the argument that the purposively selected sample in Mpumalanga contains information relevant to a very large group of rural households in this Province, are discussed in Sender and Johnston (1995).
Rather than adopt the conventional criteria used in official statistical surveys, such as whether people ‘usually eat from a common pot’, or claim to be formally married, or have been full-time residents in the recent past, adults and children were regarded as members of the same household if there was some form of financial/economic relationship between them. The forms taken by these financial relationships will be discussed below; here it may be noted that the survey identified 560 households.

The advantage of defining the boundaries of the household in financial/economic terms was that an attempt could be made to collect information concerning the characteristics of people, such as short-term migrant workers, who make a major contribution to the reproduction of the household but, because of

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Figure 1

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a temporary absence, are frequently ignored when completing socio-economic questionnaires (Breman 1996, 18–19). Thus, a conventional definition of the household that excluded the many part-time or infrequent residents would have reduced the number of people covered by 540, equivalent to reducing the size of the sample of adults by over 20 per cent. The number of respondents in the Mpumalanga survey was determined not by a formula designed to ensure a ‘representative sample’, but by the time available for closely supervised fieldwork and enumerator monitoring.

**Missing Males**

The demographic structure of the sample is remarkable because of the preponderance of adult females relative to adult males. Only 35.6 per cent of people of working age (≥25 years and ≤59 years) in the whole sample are male. An even smaller proportion of working-age males (26.2 per cent) is ‘resident full-time’ in the households covered in the survey; thus, females account for almost three-quarters of the full-time adult residents. Two-thirds of households do not contain a full-time resident adult male. If a less demanding criterion of residence is used, to include males that are resident ‘part-time’, half of the households still do not contain an adult resident male. The ratio of those adult males who are either full-time or part-time residents to adult females in the same age and residence category is extremely low (0.47).

The Agincourt Demographic and Health Study, which surveyed a much larger number of households (8896) in an area very close to that selected for the Mpumalanga survey, found a similar ratio of working-age male adults to females (0.40) for ‘permanent’ household members. Males accounted for about 29 per cent of the permanently resident working-age population in the Agincourt survey. Comparable results from the PSLSD national survey of African households in rural areas suggest a very different picture; they show an average resident male adult to resident female adult ratio of 0.71. However, the PSLSD ratio for the poorest 20 per cent of African rural households in terms of monthly income is much lower (0.46) and close to the ratio found in both the Agincourt and the Mpumalanga surveys.

The demographic structure of the female-dominated Mpumalanga survey suggests, therefore, that the households in this survey, although they are not

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4 The choice of 25 years as the age of entry into adult working life was made to facilitate comparisons with as much other demographic data as possible, although it should also be noted that many young people in South Africa do not complete secondary school until they are in their early twenties. Detailed tabulations of the Mpumalanga survey data are contained in Working Paper No. 107 in the Department of Economics Series, School of Oriental and African Studies. The Working Paper can be obtained by contacting economics@soas.ac.uk.

5 The permanent population was defined as people ‘resident in the field site for six months or more in the year preceding the census’ (Tollman et al. 1995, 23).

6 In the PSLSD national survey, a remarkably high percentage of black rural households (67 per cent) contained a full- or part-time resident adult male aged between 25 and 59 years. It has been argued that the PSLSD failed to sample a sufficient number of poor rural households (Standing et al. 1996).
dissimilar to other rural households in the area, are amongst the poorest in South Africa. In fact, the relationship between female-dominated and poor households is clear in the PSLSD data. The subset of African rural households in the PSLSD survey that could be defined as female-dominated, because the ratio of male adults to female adults was below the mean for all black rural households, or because they did not contain a single resident adult male, had a mean monthly income of Rand 690 and Rand 578, respectively. In contrast, the average rural black household had a significantly higher mean monthly income of Rand 819. The poorest quintile of African rural households in the PSLSD survey had an adult male to adult female ratio of 0.396, compared to a ratio of 0.648 for the remaining quintiles.

In the October Household Survey and the Income Expenditure Survey of 1995, those households that did not have a married male present at the time of the survey, or did not have a male household ‘head’, were far more likely to be poor; about 40 per cent of households with incomes below the poverty line fell into this category, as opposed to only 20 per cent of non-poor households (Bhorat and Leibbrandt 1998, Table 1). Similarly, in the PSLSD survey, 56.4 per cent of the households in the bottom income quintile did not contain an adult male, compared to 37.5 per cent of households in the survey as a whole. There are many other grounds for believing that the female-dominated Mpumalanga sample contains people who are extremely poor, relative to other rural (or urban) people in South Africa. However, before beginning a more detailed discussion of the relative poverty of the Mpumalanga sample, it is important to analyse some additional information concerning the nature of the relationships between adult males and other household members in this sample.

The ‘absence’ of men from the surveyed households can be discussed not only in terms of the degree to which they are resident, but also in terms of the amount of financial support that men provide to other household members. It has already been noted that two-thirds of the households surveyed do not contain a full-time resident adult male aged between 25 and 59 years. A large proportion of the women in the survey report that they do not live with men, even on a part-time or occasional basis. In particular, older women aged between 55 and 64 are most unlikely to live with a man; over 70 per cent of such women do not live with a man on a full- or part-time basis, nor do they live with a man occasionally. More
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importantly, older women are unlikely to receive any financial support from a male partner. Thus, over 70 per cent of women who are more than 40 years old do not receive support from a male in the form of monthly contributions, while 67 per cent of women in this age group do not even receive a contribution twice a year. As might be expected, younger women are somewhat more successful in obtaining financial support from male partners on a regular monthly basis, or at least twice a year, but most women in all age ranges do not receive regular financial support from males.

Women who live with children are also unlikely to receive regular financial support from men. The sample included over 1000 women with children; a high proportion of these women (almost 70 per cent) do not receive financial support from a man every month, while a somewhat lower, but still high proportion of these women (63.9 per cent) do not receive financial support from a man twice a year. Most women living with children (77 per cent) do not have a husband who is resident full-time. Women with large numbers of children are no more likely than women with smaller numbers of children to receive regular financial support from a man. While about 92 per cent of the households in the survey (513 households) contained one or more resident children, in 258 households none of the children received any financial support from their fathers.

These data suggest that, in order to survive, many of the children and women in the ‘lone-parent’ households covered by the Mpumalanga survey, in common with large numbers of poor women and children elsewhere in rural South Africa, must attempt to obtain income from a source other than the earnings of an adult male. The next section looks at the role of these other, ‘non-male’ income sources in the reproduction of the surveyed households; this is followed by an examination of the complex and differentiated consequences of male ‘absence’ in more detail.

Sources of Income

According to the PSLSD national survey data, 22.4 per cent of all African households (urban and rural) receive some income in the form of a pension and 80 per

10 Young women’s attempts to obtain cash from men are discussed later.
11 In the Agincourt Survey, 88 per cent of the households contained children. In Agincourt there were 2173 households containing children that did not have a resident adult male, equivalent to about 29 per cent of the total number of households containing children (Tollman et al. 1995, 31). A very high proportion of all rural households do not contain both the parents of teenage household members. Le Roux (1994, 6) has calculated from the PSLSD data that the proportion of rural households in which the male parent is de facto absent is over 60 per cent. Caldwell and Caldwell (1993, 251) note that in South Africa ‘men often do not bear much of the cost of raising children’.
12 Of course, women in other parts of the world also face this problem. For example, the contribution of men to household incomes has been falling dramatically in the UK in recent decades. The proportion of lone mother households rose from 7 per cent of all families with dependent children in 1971 to 21 per cent in 1994, reflecting the persistence of ‘tensions between the pressures of the capitalist labour market and the needs of social reproduction’ (Creighton 1999, 526–9). These tensions were also evident in the nineteenth century. ‘Absences of husbands and fathers, either temporary or permanent, left families dependent on the earnings of women and children . . . men’s absences were commonplace in the high mortality and economically insecure early industrial economy’ (Horrell and Humphries 1998, 27).
cent of rural African women aged 60 or over receive some pension income. However, a much lower proportion of the women aged over 60 included in the Mpumalanga survey receive a pension. There are a total of 110 women in this age category; eight of these women could not provide a satisfactory answer to questions about pensions, but of the remaining 102 women, only 35 (34 per cent) received pensions. The mean monthly pension income received by these 35 women was Rand 278, considerably below the amount that was officially supposed to be paid (Rand 370), and also below the mean amounts recorded in the PSLSD survey (Deaton and Case 1998). In the Mpumalanga survey, only about 12 per cent of households received pension payments.

An analysis of the more up-to-date data provided by the 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey (CSS 1996), which also has the advantage of covering a much larger sample of households (30,000) than the PSLSD survey (under 9000 households), confirms that large numbers of the poorest people live in households without any access to pensions and that, ‘it is the relatively better-off within the poor who are receiving state transfers (pensions)’ (Leibbrandt et al. 1998, 14). There is no doubt that many extremely poor households in Mpumalanga and elsewhere in rural South Africa would benefit if they were paid the pensions to which their older members are legally entitled. However, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the administration of pension payments in Mpumalanga and elsewhere in rural South Africa effectively excludes a number of the elderly rural poor (Budlender 1998b, 54–5). Providing documentary proof of entitlement to a pension, and the many other costs associated with the collection of pension payments, require political and financial resources that often remain beyond the reach of poor, illiterate rural women.

Thus, transfer payments such as pensions are not reaching many of the rural households in the Mpumalanga survey. As an alternative or additional source of income, some analysts have suggested that opportunities for self-employment, particularly female self-employment as smallholder agricultural producers, or in other rural micro-enterprises, have the potential to make a significant contribution to the welfare of poor rural households. They have attempted to use national survey data in support of this suggestion and as an argument for land redistribution (RDP 1994, 1995; Department of Agriculture 1995; Lipton et al. 1996; May 1998, 25). The evidence from the Mpumalanga survey, however, is that income from self-employment in small-scale agriculture is of very limited significance and certainly cannot be relied upon to ensure household survival. Thus, 93 per cent of the Mpumalanga households had never sold any of the crops they cultivated. The median area cultivated was one-third of an acre and 83 per cent of households cultivated less than one acre. Food output from these ‘gardens’ was small. When questioned about the best harvest ever achieved in any season, over three-quarters of households replied that they had never succeeded in producing a full bag of maize. Nor was it possible for households in the Mpumalanga survey to derive

13 It has been recognized that enumerator errors and problems with questionnaire design led to extremely unreliable data concerning pension payments in the PSLSD survey (May 1998, Appendix B, 7–8).
significant cash or consumption benefits from livestock enterprises: 95 per cent of households owned no cattle; 85 per cent of households owned no goats and fewer than 5 per cent of households owned more than four goats; over half of the households did not even own a single chicken, while about one-third of those households owning a chicken had fewer than three birds. Ten per cent of households in the Mpumalanga survey had no land at all to cultivate or to use for small livestock production. These landless households do not appear to be members of the very poorest group of households in terms of the Possessions Score index or in terms of Child Death Rates.\textsuperscript{14}

The results of the PSLSD national survey confirm some of the findings of the Mpumalanga survey regarding incomes from self-employment in agriculture. Most African rural households could not derive any income or consumption benefits from livestock enterprises, since over 85 per cent of these rural households did not own any cattle; about 87 per cent owned no goats; and 73 per cent owned no poultry.\textsuperscript{15} The results of a survey in KwaZulu-Natal show a similar absence of livestock in the overwhelming majority of African rural households (Data Research Africa 1992). In fact, crop and livestock production does not make a significant contribution to the imputed value of African rural household’s monthly income in the PSLSD survey. Indeed, the majority of these rural households (63 per cent) had no agricultural income at all.\textsuperscript{16} For the poorest quintile of rural households in this survey, the income derived from agriculture amounts to about Rand 33 per month (equivalent to less than US$10 at the 1994 exchange rate), while for all rural African households, it has been calculated that agriculture contributes a meagre 6 per cent to total income. Moreover, there is ‘no evidence that agricultural incomes are more important to the poorer segments of rural communities’ (Leibbrandt et al. 1994, 21). In fact, if the poorest quintile of African rural households in the PSLSD survey is divided into two categories – those households that do not receive any and those that receive some income from agriculture – then the male:female ratio for the latter is found to be much higher than for the former (0.61 vs 0.35). The conclusion, consistent with the Mpumalanga survey data, is that those extremely poor rural households containing relatively large numbers of females are the least likely to derive any income from operating their own smallholdings.\textsuperscript{17}

Less than 5 per cent of African rural women aged between 24 and 64 in the PSLSD survey defined themselves as self-employed; and self-employment made only a very minor contribution to the income of the poorest quintile of households.

\textsuperscript{14} These indices of poverty are discussed in detail below.
\textsuperscript{15} Livestock ownership amongst African rural households in the PSLSD survey was extremely skewed, with the top quintile of cattle and goat owners having almost half of these livestock.
\textsuperscript{16} A similar proportion of all African rural households in the bottom quintile of the distribution of income (61.4 per cent) derive no income at all from agriculture.
\textsuperscript{17} This may be regarded as a normal feature of capitalist development: during the nineteenth century, the UK evidence also suggests that poor families, that did not contain an adult male and/or his earning power, made less use of ‘self-provisioning’ than families with husbands present (Horrell and Humphries 1998, 61). The authors suggest that, ‘perhaps these families faced a hierarchy of needs in which the demands for money income were pre-eminent, hence the high labour market participation rates which crowded out the use of time in self-provisioning’ (ibid.).
The CSS Income and Expenditure Survey also shows that self-employment makes a tiny contribution (about 3 per cent) to the income of poor households in South Africa, while almost all ‘households below the poverty line’ do not derive any income at all from self-employment (Leibbrandt et al. 1998, Table 6a). Thus, all of the available survey data suggest that female-dominated rural households in the bottom part of the distribution of income in South Africa cannot rely on self-employment and, in particular, on self-employment as crop or livestock producers, as a means of survival. 18

Influential policy advisors who emphasize the growth of smallholder agriculture and self-employment in rural micro-enterprises as offering a feasible exit route from poverty (for example, May 1998, 16–17) should take account of the large gap that exists between their vision of the possibility of increasingly prosperous rural entrepreneurs and the effective realities currently faced by the poorest rural households. Many governments proclaim that self-employment is a route out of poverty and offer aid to small businesses in the belief that they are essential to the growth of capitalist economies, despite the fact that the evidence offers so little support to such policies. A recent survey of self-employment in OECD countries found that ‘Overall, the predominant trend in self-employment is downward’ and that ‘Increases in the proportion of self-employment appear to produce lower not higher GDP’ (Blanchflower 2000, 12, 22).

The households in the Mpumalanga survey survive because their adult female members enter the market for wage labour. Thus, a very high proportion of women of working age were either in wage employment at the time of the survey, or had recently been employed for wages. The survey covered 879 women in the age range 13–85 years who were able to provide answers to detailed questions about their employment history. The number of these women currently in wage employment is 526 (60 per cent); and an additional 353 women (40 percent) had some recent experience in the labour market, although they were not currently working. 19 The average length of time worked by women not currently working...
employed, but who had been employed within the three years preceding the survey, was 3.88 years.

Both women currently employed and women who had been employed in the three years prior to the survey were only able to obtain employment in a few specific types of occupation. ‘Basic Agricultural Labourer’ was the most important occupation; about 60 per cent of all women currently or recently in the labour market were employed in such simple field operations as weeding, harvesting and planting. Some women (about 8 per cent) were employed for all or part of the year in post-harvest operations such as packing, washing and loading agricultural produce, which are rather better paid jobs. However, work on the irrigation systems of farms, with basic agricultural labour and employment as a domestic servant, together account for over 80 per cent of the jobs held by those currently employed. The daily wage rates for the jobs into which females in the Mpumalanga survey are clustered are extremely low, the median rate being about Rand 6 per day.20

National survey data provide some evidence to support the conclusion that many of the poorest households in South Africa rely on the wages received by household members who are agricultural labourers and/or domestic servants. The reliance of the poorest quintile of African rural households on wages is clear in the PSLSD survey. Although 20 per cent of the poor households in this quintile were unable to obtain any income from wages or remitted wages, the majority of these households (58 per cent) derived almost all of their income (90 per cent or more) from wages and remitted wages.21 The importance of wages as a source of income for the poorest quintile of African rural households is also illustrated by the fact that the mean contribution of wages and remitted wages to the household income of the poorest quintile of households was relatively high.

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20 A more recent survey of 1922 female farm workers in Mpumalanga by the Farm Workers Research and Resource Project found that average cash wages for harvesting and picking, planting and domestic service were substantially lower than for all other occupations on farms and were very similar to those recorded in the Mpumalanga survey (FRRP 1997). The FRRP survey also found that the majority of farm labourers (70 per cent) had no source of income apart from that provided by their wages.

21 The PSLSD data do not include a category for ‘remitted wages’, only for ‘income from remittances’. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that the primary source of remitted income is the wage earnings of migrant household members who are not currently resident. Almost one-third of the poorest quintile of African rural households is entirely dependent for all of their income on ‘remittances’. Moreover, the poorest quintile of households obtains, on average, 48.9 per cent of its income from ‘remittances’, compared to an average for all African rural households of only 21.5 per cent. James (1993) suggests that female migrant remittances have become increasingly important to the survival prospects of rural households in areas close to those covered by the Mpumalanga survey. Unfortunately, the reliance of the poorest rural households on wages as a source of income cannot generally be estimated in LSMS-type surveys, which inexplicably exclude remittances when calculating the total income that households receive from wages. Other surveys have also been designed so that little can be learned about the labour market prospects of the poor. They report results on the sources of income for the poorest as opposed to other households in such a way that it is impossible to identify precisely the gender of employees, types of wage employment or the specific sectors offering such wage employment that are important for the poorest households (Tschirley and Weber 1994; Adams and He 1995; Dercon and Krishnan 1996). For a review of some of the empirical classification issues that have been neglected in African rural household income surveys, see Reardon (1997).
amounting to 68 per cent of total income, compared to the mean for all African rural households (59 per cent). No other source of income recorded in the PSLSD survey, whether from self-employment, agricultural production or state transfers made nearly as important a contribution to the income of poor rural households.22

An analysis that combines the national results of the October Household Survey and the Income and Expenditure Survey of 1995 has shown that access to wage income is central to determining which households are able to avoid poverty. Moreover, the depth to which poor households sink below the poverty line, and the degree of inequality amongst poor households, are also driven by levels of wage income.23 This analysis found that the most important occupation for African females was ‘Agricultural Labourer’; 46 per cent of all African female employees fell into this occupational category and their median monthly earnings (Rand 300) are very much lower than median earnings in every other female (or male) occupational category (Bohrat and Leibbrandt 1998, Table 4b). In addition, there is a very large category of informal or unregistered employment; this category of employment covers ‘Domestic Workers in Private Households’ and contains 722,024 (mainly female) workers with a relatively low median wage of Rand 387. Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1998, 16) conclude their analysis by noting that, ‘in terms of measures of poverty, these two occupational groups – labourers in agriculture and domestic workers – yield first-order low-earnings dominance over other occupations in the labour market, irrespective of the choice of the poverty line’.

Thus, the results of other recent surveys, as well as the description provided above of the characteristics of the Mpumalanga survey, suggest that the Mpumalanga data, based on a purposive sample of female agricultural labourers, is a good starting point for a detailed analysis of rural poverty in South Africa. If the households in the Mpumalanga survey differ from other South African households in the bottom quintile of the rural distribution of income in South Africa, then these differences arise mainly because of the relatively acute poverty experienced by the women and children surveyed in Mpumalanga. One of the main arguments of this paper is that a sample that focuses on such extremely

22 Several micro-surveys of rural households confirm the proposition that wage employment is an extremely important contributor to the total income of rural households (Nattrass and May 1986; de Wet et al. 1989, 66; Segar 1989, 35; Bromberger and Antonie 1993; Leibbrandt 1993, 54; de Wet 1995, 63). See also Data Research Africa (1992, 49–50). Moreover, the most recent national survey of 6000 households in the former homelands found that a tiny proportion of these households sold any agricultural produce and that ‘The main source of income took the form of salaries and wages, and only a small proportion of households relied on farming activities for their main source of income’ (Statistics South Africa 1999). However, May insists that ‘poor households typically rely on multiple sources of income’, without emphasizing that most of these ‘sources’ are insignificant in comparison to wage incomes (May 1998, 36).

23 In Brazil, the level of female wage earnings is a key determinant of poverty amongst the very poor households, where there are few or no male earners (Barros et al. 1994, 19). The importance of the role of labour markets, or employment/earnings related ‘events’, in explaining entry into and, particularly, exit from poverty is also highlighted in recent research on the dynamics of poverty in OECD economies (Antolin et al. 1999).
poor people may offer greater and more precise insights into the dynamics of poverty than the widely quoted, Washington-financed surveys designed to achieve a nationally representative sample of all households. Before discussing dynamic issues, the deprivation suffered by the Mpumalanga households will be described in more detail.

**Indices of Deprivation**

The deprivation experienced by individuals and households in the Mpumalanga survey can be described readily through an examination of child mortality, female literacy and other education attainment indices, as well as asset ownership indices. The aim of the descriptive statistics provided below is to illustrate the severity of their suffering and, where possible, to compare levels of deprivation in the Mpumalanga survey with other South African evidence concerning rural households. In addition, these descriptive statistics are used to stress the heterogeneity of the rural poor, i.e. the existence of some rural households in Mpumalanga that, according to all the indices, suffer far more/less acute deprivation than other households.

The first index examined is the ‘Possessions Score’, or asset index. Reliable data on the physical characteristics of the accommodation occupied by rural households can be collected at relatively low cost and without the myriad complexities involved in estimates of real per capita expenditure/income (Sender and Smith 1990, 29). Even poorly motivated or trained enumerators can record the presence or absence of basic consumer durables as indicators of household wealth or material well-being. Pilot surveys can be used to establish the range of relevant consumer goods for which the income-elasticity of demand is high and, at a later stage, factor analysis may help to investigate the appropriateness of the items/indices and to illuminate the method by which they could be combined.24

The Mpumalanga survey collected data on several aspects of the quality of housing and the distribution of basic consumer goods. Perhaps the clearest indicator of absolute levels of deprivation is the finding that in many households (57) not a single person owned a pair of shoes, while in the majority of households (61.3 per cent) less than one pair of shoes was owned per resident adult. A somewhat larger number of households (67) did not own a single saucepan, and much larger numbers of households did not contain such basic items of furniture as a chair (233), a bench (271) or a bed (153). An even larger number of households, in fact the majority of households, did not contain a paraffin lamp or a Primus stove. The links between people in the Mpumalanga survey and the wider world are constrained by the fact that no one owns a watch in about 41 per

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24 For a discussion of the use of factor and principal components analysis in the construction of an Asset Index or Possessions Score see Johnston (1997), Filmer and Pritchett (1998) and Stifel et al. (1999). Intuitively, principal components is a technique for extracting from a large number of variables those few orthogonal combinations of the variables that best capture the common information.
cent of households, and that about 45 per cent of households do not contain a radio.

A comparison of the proportion of Mpumalanga survey households not owning certain basic consumer goods with the proportion of African rural households without these goods in the PSLSD survey, establishes the relative degree of deprivation in Mpumalanga. For example, the PSLSD survey found that about 27 per cent of households did not own a radio, compared to about 45 per cent of households in the Mpumalanga survey. Similarly, the proportion of households owning a bicycle in the PSLSD survey was twice as great as in the Mpumalanga survey. The fact that such a tiny proportion of the Mpumalanga sample had access to electricity and to a convenient source of tapped water is a further indication of their relative deprivation. In the October Household Survey (1995), a significantly larger proportion of African rural households had access to electricity and to tap water on site, while in the PSLSD survey no less than 25.6 per cent of African rural households had access to electricity, compared to 8.3 per cent in the Mpumalanga survey.

Thus, the easily and accurately measured indicators discussed above appear to confirm that, relative to other rural African households, the households in the Mpumalanga survey are deprived of access to many basic consumer goods and live in accommodation that is manifestly inadequate. In order conveniently to analyse the distribution of this type of poverty indicator across the households in the Mpumalanga survey, and in order to assess the degree to which individual households or groups of households suffer from ‘similar’ levels of material deprivation, an aggregate index, or ‘Possessions Score’ was calculated for each household. The Possessions Score was calculated as a single figure that attempts a crude summary of each household’s achievement with regard to ownership of a range of the consumer goods that might reasonably be considered to contribute to their material welfare.

There are good grounds for believing that classifying households on the basis of an asset index such as the Possessions Score not only produces similar results to a classification based on per capita consumption expenditures, but in fact...
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provides a better basis for predicting important aspects of household welfare, such as the educational attainment of household members, than consumption expenditures. Household consumption expenditure and the Possessions Score can both be interpreted as proxies for something unobserved: namely, a household’s economic status. ‘There is no a priori argument as to why current consumption expenditures are a better proxy of long-run household economic status than an index of assets’ (Filmer and Pritchett 1998, 23). Besides, the Possessions Score is much less contaminated with measurement error than most conventional measures of household consumption expenditures.

In a typical Living Standards Measurement Survey, such as the PSLSD, an extraordinarily ambitious attempt is made to construct comprehensive household accounts by asking one or more members to recall amounts purchased and consumed from home production of 34 food items (past two weeks), ‘daily’ and ‘annual’ expenditures on 39 different non-food items, rent (actual or imputed), utility expenditures, expenditure on education, the use and value of durables, remittances paid out and wage income in kind. Note that an asset index also has the clear advantage that it does not require the estimation of a price deflator for inter-regional and inter-temporal comparisons of welfare. Price data were collected for consumption items such as salt, sugar, oil, soap, candles and dry beans from 18 shops in the Mpumalanga survey area between December 1993 and January 1994. There were very large differences indeed in the prices for these basic items in different shops in the same vicinity, but the price differentials between ‘rural’ shops and shops in the nearby ‘White’ town of Hoedspruit were especially large (of the order of 50 per cent, or greater). There were also large gaps in the effective rates of interest charged by rural shopkeepers on credit advanced to different categories of consumer for the purchase of basic food (maize meal). In this context, which is by no means untypical of rural areas of poor countries, any attempt to analyse household welfare on the basis of comparisons of real expenditures per household would face extraordinary difficulties.

In the Mpumalanga survey, no attempt was made to attach a monetary value to housing or possessions, so avoiding the inaccuracies of imputation and the complexities of depreciation estimates. However, an effort was made to develop a scale neutral score. For instance, it would not be useful to give larger households, containing many residents, a score that crudely reflected their greater number of possessions relative to other households, even when the number of possessions per resident was exceptionally low. Several alternative ‘Possessions Scores’ were computed for the Mpumalanga survey and estimates were made of the strength of correlation between different Possessions Scores. An important reason for using the Possessions Score finally chosen, quite apart from the fact that it was strongly correlated with the other variants, was that the questionnaires provided usable information on a full range of all the items chosen as the components of this particular Score, thus excluding as few households as possible because of ‘missing data’. (The Possessions Score discussed below could be calculated for over 96 per cent of the households in the Mpumalanga survey). However, the
final choice of the method of constructing the Possessions Score, as well as the decision not to attach weights to any item in the score, had to rely on a judgement concerning the heuristic contribution of the construct to the analysis of poverty.

The ten items selected for inclusion in the Possessions Score, on the basis of the analyses and judgement described in the preceding paragraph, were: a bed; watch; radio; bicycle; paraffin lamp; Primus stove; stove; sewing machine; accommodation constructed with baked brick or cement block walls; and a separate toilet (room or building). In calculating this household score, each of these ten items received an identical weight, contributing one point to each household’s final score.28 Thus, households with a Possessions Score equal to 0 fall into the bottom decile of the distribution of Possessions Scores. They live in accommodation constructed with mud that does not contain a toilet. In these households, there are no beds; no form of lighting other than candles; no cooking facility other than an open fire; no radios; and no resident owns a watch, a bicycle or a sewing machine. Most of the households that achieved a Possessions Score of 1, falling into the bottom fifth of the distribution of Possessions Scores, also do not possess a Primus stove (96.8 per cent) or paraffin lamp (95.2 per cent), while none of these households contain any other type of stove, a bicycle or a sewing machine. They could be distinguished from households with a Possessions Score of zero mainly because someone, in about 20 per cent of these households, owns a bed, a radio or a watch. The characteristics of those households that achieved a high Possessions Score (about 120 households) will be discussed below, when possible escape routes from poverty are mapped. Here it will simply be noted that, in terms of the Possessions Score index, some of the households in the Mpumalanga survey appear to be very much less deprived than others.

The heterogeneity of the households in the Mpumalanga survey also emerges when other indices of deprivation are examined. For example, the most important of the standard indicators of welfare, namely the literacy or educational achievements of female household members, are also extremely skewed in the Mpumalanga survey.29 The total numbers and proportion of females and males who could not read and write was analysed, as well as the figures for those who had never attended school. Clearly, not all of those who had been to school

28 More complex and less arbitrary decisions on the choice of weights are theoretically possible and are discussed in Filmer and Pritchett (1998), as well as in Stifel et al. (1999). Nevertheless, the former note that in constructing their own index the first principal component did not cover all the relevant information, while the second principal component was difficult to interpret. The latter placed large positive weights on the ownership of a television and a radio, as well as piped drinking water and a flush toilet, but were forced to modify their chosen index because of missing data. A systematic algorithm for weighting household assets has been developed by Morris et al. (1999). However, their asset index relies on the validity of respondents’ estimates of the current monetary value of each asset, and excludes any consideration of housing, i.e. the assets that are likely to be the most valuable owned by rural households, on the grounds that ‘it is rarely possible to attach a monetary value to housing stock’ (p. 9).

29 On the importance of female literacy, as well as of estimates of the gap between the education of females and males, as indicators of the welfare of all household members, see King and Hill (1993) and Krishnaji (1995).
for a few years were literate; in fact, about 49 per cent of females were unable to read or to write, while only about 41 per cent had never been to school.\textsuperscript{30}

However, there are strong arguments for an alternative measure of literacy: it has been suggested that a less unequal distribution of literacy across households leads to greater ‘effective literacy’, because having a literate member in the household can make a substantial difference for each illiterate member in accessing information and accomplishing tasks that require literacy skills. The advantages to an illiterate person of having access to a literate female household member may be even greater than those arising from access to a literate male household member (Basu and Foster 1998, 24). In fact, the distribution of literate adults across households is extremely uneven in the Mpumalanga survey; about 17 per cent of households do not contain a single literate adult, while 34 per cent of households do not contain a literate adult female. In contrast, a group consisting of 122 households (22 per cent of the total number of surveyed households) contains more than three literate adults per household. Those households without a literate adult achieve a significantly lower mean Possessions Score (2.52) than households that do contain a literate adult (4.01).\textsuperscript{31}

In order to examine in more detail the important issue of differences between households with respect to female educational attainment, an additional index was computed for the Mpumalanga sample. A ‘Female Education Deficit index’ was constructed to compare the number of years of education achieved by female household members to the number of years of education that they could possibly have achieved. Those households with a large average Female Education Deficit (FED equal to \(-12\)) contain women who, although they are all of an age to have completed 12 years of education, have all failed to complete any years of schooling. In selecting the households to be compared, the criterion was that they should contain female residents old enough to have completed 12 years of education, but not so old as to have been of school-going age in the 1950s, for instance, when there were far fewer opportunities for African rural females to attend school.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition, households were selected that contained a comparable number of female residents, since average Education Deficit scores for households

\textsuperscript{30} The female illiteracy rate was measured differently in the Agincourt survey; females were defined as illiterate if they were over the age of 15 and had failed to achieve at least four years of schooling. Using this definition, 37.3 per cent of women in the Agincourt survey were illiterate and 44.8 per cent of women in the Mpumalanga survey were illiterate. The proportion of people aged between 25 and 59 years in the Agincourt survey who had never attended school was 42.5 per cent (Tollman et al. 1995, 36). In the Mpumalanga survey, a somewhat larger proportion of people in this age group (50.8 per cent) had never attended school. Although the PSLSD literacy sample was biased, in that it failed to include sufficient poor, rural African households, it confirms that it is invalid to define literacy levels in terms of the number of years of school completed (Fuller et al. 1995).\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{31} 43.3 per cent of the households without a literate adult had a Possessions Score less than or equal to 1, while only 17.4 per cent of households containing a literate adult were in this category. The absence of any literate females is also associated with low Possessions Scores: only about 12 per cent of the households with a literate adult female had a Possessions Score of less than or equal to 1, compared to about 40 per cent of the households without a literate adult female.

\textsuperscript{32} Most women in the Mpumalanga sample aged over 50 years (84 per cent) had never attended school. On female education in this area in the 1950s, see Ritchken (1995, 357).
with very large numbers of female residents could not meaningfully be compared to the Deficit recorded for households with only one female resident. Thus, the method of standardizing households to construct the FED was to select only those households containing at least two female residents aged between 20 and 50 years.33

The median Female Education Deficit for the standardized group of Mpumalanga households was –8.0; the bottom 20 per cent of the distribution of households had a Female Education Deficit of –12; less than 3 per cent of households achieved a Female Education Deficit of better than –2. The bottom 20 per cent of households in the distribution of the Female Education Deficit had significantly lower Possessions Scores than those recorded for the top 20 per cent of households in terms of the Female Education Deficit. None of the latter group of households recorded a Possessions Score equal to 0 or to 1, compared to 41.3 per cent of those households in the lowest quintile of the distribution of the Female Education Deficit index.34 Clearly, some households in this survey are very much worse off than others, both in terms of the education of female members of the household and in terms of access to material possessions.

Using the same methodology, the education achieved by all household members, male as well as female, was examined by computing a ‘Household Education Deficit’ (HED) index. This index was computed for the larger group of households containing at least two residents of either gender and in the appropriate age group, i.e. between 20 years and 50 years.35 The distribution of households by the HED index is similar to the distribution by the FED index and the two indices are positively correlated.36 Households that fail to achieve an adequate level of education for their female members are, therefore, likely to be the same households that fail to achieve an adequate level of education for all their members.37

33 The average number of female residents in this age category per household was 1.63. The Female Education Deficit index was computed for about 42 per cent of the households in the survey.
34 There is a significant correlation between the Female Education index and the Possessions Score – Pearson correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
35 The HED index was computed for about 66 per cent of the households in the survey. It is surprising that: ‘The overwhelming majority of the literature assumes that the educational attainment of the head of household measures the entire household’s level of educational attainment’ (Jolliffe 1997, 2). The limitations of this literature are discussed by Jolliffe, who attempts to find a unidimensional statistic, similar to the HED, that is a better measure of school attainment.
36 Pearson correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The HED is also significantly correlated with the Possessions Score, although the relationship is slightly weaker than that between the FED and the Possessions Score.
37 It is, of course, difficult to analyse the distribution of the gender gap across households in the Mpumalanga survey, since so many households do not contain an adult male. Nevertheless, the survey data on individuals do provide some evidence of a large gender gap in educational achievement. A much higher proportion of females (49 per cent) than males (31 per cent) is illiterate. Moreover, the average number of years of education completed by adult females (3.36) is only about 75 per cent of the comparable figure for males (4.49 years). However, younger age cohorts of women have attended school for longer: the gender gap for the group aged between 24 and 30 years is significantly lower than for those aged over 60 years, while the gender gap disappears altogether in the age group 18–23 years.
Relative to the population of rural Africans covered in other South African samples, the population in the Mpumalanga survey suffers from a high degree of educational deprivation. Thus, the October Household Survey found that 23 per cent of African females aged over 25 years had never attended school (Budlender 1998a); the comparable figure for this age group in the Mpumalanga survey was 62 per cent. In the PSLSD survey of African rural households in the former homelands, about 58 per cent of working-age females had failed to complete Primary School, compared to about 74 per cent of working-age females in the Mpumalanga survey. Younger girls in the Mpumalanga survey were also less likely to attend school than were the African rural girls covered by the October Household Survey: only 2.8 per cent of African rural females in the age group 10–14 years were not attending school in the OHS (CSS 1996, Table 8.2), compared to almost 7 per cent of girls in this age group in the Mpumalanga survey.

The low level of education achieved by women is likely to have an adverse effect on the nutrition and survival prospects for their children. The death of young children may be acknowledged, even by die-hard cultural relativists, as a useful indicator of deprivation and suffering. The Mpumalanga survey collected information concerning the number of children ever born to all women, the number of child deaths and the age at which children died. High rates of child death are a feature of the Mpumalanga survey. Most women, a total of 1075, had given birth to at least one child, and a total of 4971 births were reported. A high proportion, about 47 per cent (496 women), reported that at least one of their children had died. A total of 1035 child deaths were recorded, and 807 children died before reaching the age of 5 years (at a mean age of 13.4 months).

Data from 63 countries for the period 1970–1995 strongly suggest that a key determinant of reductions in child malnutrition (and mortality rates) is improvements in women’s education, both in absolute terms and relative to men’s education (Smith and Haddad 1999). Stifel et al. (1999) also find a generally positive and significant relationship between maternal education and children’s weight-for-height in the DHS data for Africa. See also Jejeebhoy (1998, chapter 6).

This result is consistent with other evidence suggesting that children’s vulnerability, and clinical evidence of wasting, peaks between the ages of 12 and 23 months, during the period when the children of rural African women are weaning (Ashworth and Dowler 1991).
Thus, the under-five mortality rate, defined as the ratio of the total number of births to the total number of child deaths at an age of less than 5 years, is 0.162.\textsuperscript{43}

Child deaths are not evenly distributed amongst the women, or the households, in the Mpumalanga survey. Some of the 496 women who reported the death of a child had seen more than one of their children die. On average, each of these women had suffered from the death of 2.09 children; 72 women reported that more than three of their children had died. Women reporting that at least one of their children had died were more likely than other women to have given birth to a large number of children; the mean number of children born to these women was 6.44, compared to a mean of only 3.16 for the 516 women not reporting a child death.\textsuperscript{44}

Child deaths were concentrated in a subset of households. In 163 households, an average of more than 25 per cent of the children have died, while in a similar number of households (165) none of the children born have died. The mean proportion of child deaths for all the households is 16.6 per cent; the median is 12.5 per cent. Some households experienced extremely high rates of child death; in these 37 households, an average of half (or more) of the children born died. The median Possessions Score for these 37 households was 2, while households in which no children had died had a median Possessions Score of 4. There were significant correlations between household child death ratios and both the Female Education Deficit and the Possessions Score.\textsuperscript{45}

It may be concluded, therefore, that the poverty indices used to describe the Mpumalanga survey are reasonably consistent and robust. They identify a group of deprived households characterized at first glance by the paucity of their possessions and the inadequacy of their accommodation. In these households the adult women are likely to have little or no education and their children, whether girls or boys, are likely to die before they reach the age of five; if do they survive, they are unlikely to complete more than a few years of schooling. However, despite the poverty of the population in the survey relative to other South Africans, these indices also reveal some stark differences between the surveyed households. In some households, standards of living are much less degraded; children are likely to survive and to acquire an education. Even in the absence of panel data or longitudinal survey results, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of these less deprived households may be able to provide some

\textsuperscript{43} 47 per cent of the children that died were female, confirming that in rural South Africa, unlike much of South Asia, child mortality rates are not biased against girls. However, relatively low gender differentials in death rates have also been reported amongst the poorest, agricultural wage labouring households in India: ‘In very poor families in which food is in very short supply and the means for taking care of sick children are practically non-existent, such discrimination as can be practised may well be ineffective in securing greater chances for male child survival’ (Krishnaji 1995, 2808).

\textsuperscript{44} Indian data appears to have established that there are links between the average number of children ever born to women and child survival prospects (Krishnaji 1995, 2807). African DHS data consistently show that as birth order increases, the nutritional status of children deteriorates (Stifel et al. 1999, 22). See also Glick and Sahn (1998, 364).

\textsuperscript{45} Pearson correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
insight into the dynamics of transitions out of poverty, as well as some guidance in the formulation of anti-poverty policies.

POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTES FROM POVERTY

Some Comparative Evidence

The evidence across a range of countries suggests that there is considerable movement into and out of poverty (Grootaert et al. 1995; Antolin et al. 1999; Jayaraman and Lanjouw 1999). The developing country literature on these movements is sparse and there are few detailed micro-studies of the dynamics of escapes from poverty. One South African study, which has used the techniques of oral history to trace the lives of a small group of black rural women through the twentieth century, provides important insights into the dynamics of success. However, the Bofokeng women who were the subject of this study were quite highly educated, came from ‘relatively wealthy peasant backgrounds’ and followed a strategy of migration to urban areas (Bozzoli 1991, 47). Women in the Mpumalanga survey come from much poorer backgrounds and have less experience of urban life. Van Onselen’s history of an extraordinarily talented sharecropping family’s struggles during the twentieth century is a harrowing account of the destruction of the strong and the resilient, of ‘social, economic and moral decay’ (Van Onselen 1996, 511); it does not illustrate a viable escape route from poverty.

A recent survey in India of the largest body of evidence on changes in poverty over time paid far more attention to accounting for movements into poverty than to analysing the circumstances under which exits from poverty occur, or the characteristics of households moving out of poverty. The rather vague conclusion reached was that, ‘Households moved in and out of poverty in response to price changes, harvest levels, and the partitioning of household lands . . . movement can be attributed to fluctuations in harvest quality and to personal calamities’ (Jayaraman and Lanjouw 1999, 15). Much more useful accounts of reductions in rural poverty, focusing on the determinants of rising female real wage rates in rural India, have been provided by Sen and Ghosh (1993) and by Bhalla (1997). Longitudinal micro work in Palanpur also shows rising real agricultural wage rates and stresses that the ‘most important basis of upward economic mobility seems to be wage employment outside the village . . . It is indeed hard to think of many other events that could be expected to improve the economic conditions of an agricultural labourer or small farmer to the same extent . . .’ (Drèze et al. 1998, 36).

Three years of panel data from the Ivory Coast Living Standards Survey between 1985 and 1988 have been fitted to a model to investigate which rural households ‘managed to buck the overall trend of immiserization and to escape from poverty’ (Grootaert et al. 1995, 3). Although a significant number of households did escape poverty over this period, the model was not very successful in explaining improvements in household welfare in terms of the large number
of selected socio-economic characteristics of households, and the authors’ policy conclusions are remarkably similar to the conventional or stereotypical World Bank prescriptions. Thus, small households ‘headed’ by young men with access to large amounts of farm equipment and land, as well as to non-farm sources of income, described as small enterprises, are those best placed to escape from poverty. This conveniently describes those households that are the major beneficiaries of World Bank lending in the rural areas of developing countries (Mosley and Hulme 1998; Tjønneland 1998, 59), but is of little help in analysing the poorest women’s exit routes from poverty in rural South Africa.

A more recent 5-year longitudinal household survey from rural Pakistan found substantial movements into and out of poverty, but reached few robust conclusions on the determinants of exits from poverty, other than emphasizing how important small household size was in increasing the probability of exits (Baulch and McCulloch 1998). This result probably hinges on the conventional definition of ‘poverty’ in terms of income per capita. Since most rural households have levels of income per capita that are very close to the conventionally defined poverty line, the death or migration of just one member of the household automatically allows that household to ‘exit’ poverty. This amounts to a rather uninteresting, not to say trivial, analysis of exits from poverty.

**De-linking from Men?**

One interesting result of the model fitted to the Ivory Coast Panel data is that the presence of adult males in rural households appears to have a negative effect on levels of rural household expenditure: ‘looking at the full model, each adult male reduces per capita expenditure by 12,820 CFAF, more than twice as much as a child or female adult’ (Grootaert et al. 1995, 14). This conclusion cannot be tested directly with South African data, but the Mpumalanga survey does raise some questions concerning the contribution made by adult males to the economic welfare of the more successful households. In particular, the absence of men from successful households does not appear to impose an insuperable barrier to achieving relatively high standards of living.

In a large number of households (305), men do not provide financial support to the mothers of their children every month, or even twice a year (313). In fact,
there are only 127 households (less than one-quarter of the total number of households) in which all children receive regular financial support from their fathers. It is widely recognized in the survey area that, ‘one sides with one’s mother in the event of a dispute between parents, because mothers raise their children against the considerable odds caused by the indifference of fathers’ (Kotzé 1993, 78).

The small group of households that have established a stable financial link between all resident children and an adult male appear to be no less poverty-stricken than the households without such links. Thus, the mean Possessions Score for households in which all children receive financial support from an adult male every month is 3.5, while the mean Possessions Score for ‘de-linked’ households in which none of the children receive any financial support from a male is actually somewhat higher (3.65). Only about 20 per cent of ‘de-linked’ households have a Possessions Score of less than 2, while 30 per cent of the households in which all children receive regular support have Possessions Scores of less than 2.

Households in which none of the children receive financial support from a male appear to do rather better in terms of other poverty indices as well: the Child Death Rate is lower and the Household Educational Deficit, as well as Female Education Deficit, are lower for this group than for the group of households in which all children receive regular financial support from a male. This is not to suggest that ‘de-linking’ from male financial flows is always an effective strategy for enhancing household welfare, but merely to demonstrate that some households appear to have been able to achieve improved standards of living even in the absence of regular financial support from males. In fact, the relationship between male financial support/residence and household welfare is rather complex and calls for further discussion. 49

A more precise definition of the characteristics of the group of ‘relatively successful households’ is required, before even the first steps can be taken towards a detailed exploration of the complexity of the relationship between the welfare of women and children and their links with men. The method chosen here to identify such a group focuses on households that are in the top part (the highest quintile) of the distribution of the four key indices described in the previous section: the Possessions Score, the Female Education Deficit, the Household Education Deficit and the Child Death Ratio, i.e. on those exceptional households that achieved a Possessions Score more than or equal to 6; a Female and Household Education Deficit superior or equal to –5 years; and a Child Death

48 Some husbands in rural South Africa clearly place a greater priority than their wives on maintaining access to the labour of female children. Tensions therefore arise between men and women concerning whether or not girls should attend school regularly, or continue to attend school (Van Onselen 1996, 417).

49 There has been a great deal of discussion in the literature on rural poverty concerning ‘female-headed’ households (Guyer and Peters 1987; Barros et al. 1994; Moore 1994; Whitehead and Lockwood 1999). However, identifying ‘the head’ is by no means easy and, as suggested at the beginning of this article, the boundaries of ‘households’ are also difficult to define. So, further sub-divisions of ‘female-headed’ households, into those that are in receipt of different levels of support from men, are often required in order to iron out anomalies in the classification of households. The detailed consequences of relationships with men are not usually examined in this growing literature.
Ratio equal to zero. Unfortunately, less than 2 per cent of the households in the survey managed to satisfy all of these criteria, although about one-third of the surveyed households satisfied one condition, and over 7 per cent (40 households) were successful in terms of three or more of the four threshold conditions. It is important to emphasize that this group of 40 relatively prosperous households does not appear to rely on the regular financial contributions of men, and that a high proportion of these households do not contain a full- or part-time resident male. In only a small proportion of this group of households (12.8 per cent) do all children receive regular financial support from a man. In contrast, in about 30 per cent of poorer households, satisfying none of the criteria specified above, all children are receiving regular financial support from men.

It is also useful to define a group of even more deprived households than those failing to satisfy any of the four criteria. These extremely poor households all fall into the bottom 30 per cent of the distribution of Possessions Scores and Child Death Rates. The ‘most deprived’ group contains 57 households that recorded both a Possessions Score equal to or less than 2 and a Child Death Rate equal to or more than 0.24. In 33.3 per cent of these households, all children were receiving regular financial support from men and 42.1 per cent of women in these households reported that their husbands were resident on a full-time or part-time basis. Thus, in the Mpumalanga survey, stable financial links with men are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for avoiding the depths of poverty. It may even be the case that a stable link with a man has the effect of blocking the most important escape route from poverty.

The presence of a man might not simply have the arithmetic effect, noted in the Ivory Coast panel data, of reducing household expenditure per capita, when male claims on household expenditure are greater than their contribution to household earnings. It is possible to suggest a less superficial account of the welfare effect of men’s relationship with rural households, by focusing on one aspect of their coercive power within these households. A key point is that many women in the Mpumalanga survey (291) report that their husbands have prevented them from seeking wage employment; one-third of the women aged 25 years or older claimed that they had been prevented from obtaining a job by their husbands. Moreover, discussion during interviews suggested that some of the women who were currently wage employed had also been prevented by their husbands from long-distance commuting in search of more stable forms of employment.

50 A total of 70 households fell into the category of ‘the most deprived’, but 13 of these households were unable to report on whether or not children were financially supported by male adults, because they did not contain any resident children.
51 In the relatively successful households, a smaller proportion of women (33 per cent) report that their husbands are resident on a full-time or part-time basis. It is also noteworthy that 45 per cent of women in the relatively successful households report that they have been divorced or deserted, compared to 23.5 per cent of women in the most deprived households.
52 An analysis of men’s attempts to prevent women from obtaining agricultural wage employment in Tanzania, as well as a general discussion of male resistance to female proletarianization is provided in Sender and Smith (1990, 65). The long-term implications of male restrictions on the deployment of female labour outside the home are discussed in Goldstone (1996). On men preventing women from seeking employment in Uganda and related conflicts/violence, see Goudge (1998, ch. 6).
employment on the larger-scale agribusinesses located at some distance from their homes. This is because men suspect that, if women commute on a monthly basis, they are likely to form new sexual liaisons (Kotzé and van der Waal 1995, 8). The advantage to a woman of commuting to obtain employment is not only the autonomy provided by their own more regular wage income, but also the possibility of forming a relationship with a male earning relatively high wages from a ‘White’ agribusiness employer and the valuable opportunity to tap into these male wages before men make the journey home to face the demands of other women (Kotzé 1993, 92).

The international evidence suggests that there is a strong relationship between patterns of participation in the labour market and the risk of spousal violence. In particular, there is evidence that a woman’s employment may increase her risk of abuse if, as is often the case in the Mpumalanga survey area, her husband is unemployed. Systematic abuse reflects efforts to control the female partner; the probability of a male partner using violent coercive methods to control his spouse is greatest in couples in which the female partner is employed and the male partner is not (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). In Kisii District, Kenya, where the majority of women also cannot rely on any financial support from an adult male and ‘households have become violent battlegrounds’, recent data, including well-documented cases of violence against women from the District Hospital, ‘indicate that violent (sexual) behaviour, even rape, seems to have become men’s strategies in their pursuit of control, identity, self-esteem and social value’ (Silberschmidt 1999, 119, 168). Research in Bangladesh also suggests that when female employment constitutes a challenge to the culturally prescribed norm of male dominance and female dependence, then violence may be the method chosen by men to reinstate their authority over their partner. A woman ‘... took a job at a rice mill just outside the village after her husband fell ill and was unable to support them. Her better-off cousins accused her husband of dishonouring their family and her husband beat her up’ (Schuler et al. 1996, 1735). Although the Mpumalanga survey did not directly attempt to collect information on male violence towards women, there can be little doubt that this is a pervasive phenomenon in rural South Africa and is perceived as a daily threat in the survey area (Human Rights Watch 1995; Kotzé and van der Waal 1995; Ritchken 1995, 363).

Women who reported that their husband had prevented them from working for wages were only able to achieve a mean of 4.92 years of work experience (median=3 years), compared to a mean of 7.4 years for the group of women that did not face restrictions imposed by their husbands (median=4 years). Of course,

53 Other work in South Africa, in Qwaqwa, has shown that men ‘fear that as wage-earners women threatened their dominant position ... and argued that women’s work should be confined to housekeeping ... Such attitudes generated great tensions within households. This was evident in ... numerous episodes of marital violence between unemployed husbands and their working wives’ (Niehaus 1994, 121–2).

54 The scale of violence towards women in developing countries and its impact in terms of disability-adjusted life years, which is of the order of the impact of HIV, is discussed in Heise et al. (1994) and Zwi et al. (1996).
the length of female work experience is affected by factors other than the coercive behaviour of male partners, including women’s experience of childbearing. Moreover, women’s work experience may be reduced not only by male coercion, as described above, but also by the fact that a relationship with a man may involve caring for men, or their children and parents, when they fall ill. Most women left paid employment involuntarily, because employers had laid them off during a slack period or a drought. However, the data obtained on reasons for all job quits shows that when women left paid employment on their own, rather than an employer’s initiative, many of these ‘voluntary’ departures (20 per cent) were explained in terms of the need to spend time caring for family members, while an additional 8 per cent of ‘voluntary’ departures were accounted for by marriage, a husband’s desire that women should not work or a change of abode usually associated with a change in the form of co-habitation.

Therefore, one mechanism that may account for deprivation is a relationship with a man who blocks access to more secure, stable forms of employment and effectively reduces the total number of years that a woman spends at work. Work experience is an important determinant of wage rates; and the wage income earned by female household members is critical for household welfare. Relatively successful households are, therefore, likely to contain women who have greater work experience and have been able to resist men’s attempts to prevent them from securing more highly paid wage employment.

Women’s earnings are, of course, determined by factors other than male coercion and the fact that women feel obliged to nurture family members. Further discussion of the determinants of female wages is provided below. Nevertheless, even before attempting a more detailed account of the underlying causes of the differences between households with respect to female labour market performance, it appears that a continuing financial relationship with an adult male may have a negative impact on the level of wages earned by females. A comparison of the mean (pooled) daily earnings of females in two groups of households illustrates this point. In the first group of households, where no child is receiving regular financial support from an adult male, the mean of the current daily wage earned by all females in the household is Rand 11.06 (median equal to Rand 7.00); in the second group of households, where all children receive regular financial support from an adult male, the mean female current daily wage is significantly lower (Rand 6.78, with the median equal to Rand 4.76).\textsuperscript{55}

There are, of course, some households that have succeeded in escaping from the worst features of poverty through securing access to the wage income of a man. Not only do these households contain adult males, but also the men receive relatively high wages. Successful households in the Mpumalanga survey are considerably larger than the most deprived households; they are more likely to

\textsuperscript{55} The occupational breakdown of individual female employees who do and do not receive monthly support from husbands/male partners is similar, with over 60 per cent of both groups of women currently employed in the lowest paid categories, as basic field labourers or domestic servants. Nevertheless, women who do not receive monthly financial support from a man are receiving a somewhat higher mean daily wage (Rand 12.01) than the women who do (Rand 11.04).
contain a larger number of both male and female wage earners. Thus, the most successful households contain, on average, 5.88 residents over the age of 14 years, compared to an average of only 3.11 in the most deprived households. If adults above the age of 60 are excluded, on the grounds that they are less likely to be in the labour force, then these two groups of households contain 5.18 and 2.90 resident adults of working age, respectively. About 20 per cent of the most deprived households contain only one adult of working age, whereas all relatively successful households have at least two adults of working age, a result consistent with international panel data that identify single-adult households as over-represented among the long-term poor and show that households with more than one worker are better protected from poverty and have shorter stays in poverty (Antolin et al. 1999, 6).

On average, the most deprived households contained only 1.46 adults in current employment (median equal to 1.00), compared to an average of 1.70 in the successful households (median equal to 2.00). Moreover, in only three of the 70 most deprived households (4.3 per cent) did the pooled wages of currently employed males contribute more than Rand 10 per day to household wage income. In contrast, the pooled wages of currently employed men amounted to over Rand 28 per day in 25 per cent of the more successful households, the majority of which (55 per cent) contained at least one currently employed adult male.

Nevertheless, the most striking feature of those households that have made some progress towards escaping from poverty is not that some of them contain men who are earning relatively high wages. The success of these particular households appears rather to be based on the fact that they contain a number of women who are able to earn significantly more than women in other households. Perhaps as a result of their success in the labour market, these exceptional women have been able to break away from some of the constraints that men place on women’s employment prospects. Or, perhaps it was their efforts not to remain within the confines of a stable relationship with a man that explain their success in the

56 This result, based on a measure of deprivation/poverty that differs from the conventional per capita income/expenditure measure, contradicts the usual assumption (Lipton and Ravallion 1993, 30; World Bank 2000, 1.22) that poor rural households are relatively large. The evidence from Africa for one of the most important indicators of rural poverty – infant and under three mortality rates – also clearly indicates that there is a lower probability of death for children in larger households (Stifel et al. 1999, 24). See also Barros et al. (1994, Table 6). On the destitution of small households in rural Lebowa, see James (1985a).

57 In the Mpumalanga survey, the number of adults of working age in a household and the Possessions Score are significantly and positively correlated (Pearson correlation significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed).

58 Note that a much higher proportion of working-age adults is currently employed in the most deprived households in the Mpumalanga survey. This is consistent with the argument that by no means all poor households in rural South Africa suffer from unemployment (see Standing et al. 1996, 252-4; Bhorat and Leibbrandt 1998). OECD data, especially for the United States, also suggest that many of the long-term poor live in households with at least one employed worker (Antolin et al. 1999, 13). Recent discussions of poverty in South Africa continue to assume, in the face of all the evidence, that poverty is best explained in terms of the incidence of unemployment (May 1998, 36). The fact that many of the poor are employed and that reducing unskilled workers’ wages would harm the poorest households, whether or not such a reduction had the textbook neo-classical effect of rapidly increasing the number of people employed, is usually ignored in South African debates.
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labour market. The dominant causal relationship is hard to identify, but it is not difficult to describe some of the other characteristics of these relatively successful women and the households in which they live.

The Women Who Get Better Jobs

The distribution of current female wage earnings in the Mpumalanga survey is extremely uneven. The mean female daily wage is Rand 11.1, the median is 6.7 and the standard deviation 10.5. The gap between average pooled current female earnings in the relatively successful and the most deprived households is large, supporting the proposition that the level of female wages is likely to be an important part of any explanation of escapes from poverty. Many of the women who earn relatively high wages share certain characteristics that distinguish them from women who are less successful in the labour market. Some of these characteristics have already been discussed, in an analysis of the effect on work experience of relationships with men, but labour market performance is also influenced by other social, political and structural factors. These factors, which include employer’s strategies and state policies, are considered here and lead to the policy conclusions offered at the end of this paper.

Some recent economic literature on wages and labour markets in poor rural areas is premised on the assumption of ‘intra-village wage uniformity’. Indian agricultural labour markets are the source of the most sophisticated econometric work and the most comprehensive data; it has been argued that one of the key features of these labour markets is that: ‘Within the village, the daily agricultural wage rate for a given operation is typically uniform for casual agricultural labourers of the same gender, in spite of well-known differences in their productive abilities’ (Datt 1996, 46; Bardhan and Udry 1999, 41).

However, the distribution of daily wage rates for all women within the Mpumalanga survey area currently employed as fieldworkers in the same, least-skilled agricultural operations (weeding, planting and harvesting) shows little evidence of uniformity. It is unlikely, therefore, that wage outcomes in Mpumalanga can be analysed in terms of the simple two-party (labourers and

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59 In the OECD context, the positive association between a mother’s employment and the risk of her partnership with a male dissolving has been explained by arguing that the causation is from anticipation of the break-up with the male to employment behaviour, rather than vice versa. However, the point is also made that paid employment makes it much easier for a women to leave an unsatisfactory partnership (Dex and Joshi 1999, 648).

60 Skewness=2.03; Kurtosis=5.45.

61 FRRP has collated and collected data on the daily wages of casual farm labourers in South Africa that show very wide differences in wage rates for both black and coloured workers within as well as between different geographical areas (Greenberg 1996). Their survey of farms in the Free State, North West Province, Gauteng and Northern Province shows wide differences between the levels and forms of payment to female casual labourers between districts and between farms within the same district (Greenberg 1997, 28–9). For the spread of seasonal female farm wages within farms in the Eastern Free State, see Johnston (1997, 183). The historical evidence concerning labour on ‘White’ farms contains many examples of varying forms and levels of wage payments within single districts and even on single farms (Jeeves and Crush 1997, 3, 22).
employers) asymmetric Nash bargaining solution that has been used to analyse the Indian ‘village labour market’ context. Indeed, the assumption that the interests and bargaining strength of all unskilled female farm labourers in the survey are similar cannot be accepted, for reasons discussed below.

In the earlier literature, a standard approach to explaining differentials in daily wage rates was to assume a competitive labour market, even in the poorest rural areas, and regress the wages received by individual female workers per unit of time on a vector of worker attributes. Often, some regressors were included to capture the effects of demand side factors. The underlying assumption is that the (hedonic) wage function reflects an equilibrium between the forces of supply and demand for labour at each level of worker attributes. However, such wage equations do not always find that individual worker attributes are significant; moreover, all wage function studies, both Mincer-type and others, find it impossible to provide a convincing account of the empirical realities of persistent involuntary unemployment in poor rural areas and the obvious failure of prevailing wages to clear agricultural labour markets (Datt 1996, 35–41). Nor have efficiency-wage models, building on a presumed link between nutrition intake and work efficiency in poor rural areas, achieved any empirical success at all in their efforts to explain differences in wages in terms of the characteristics of different asset groups of workers (Klasen and Woolard 1998, 40; Strauss and Thomas 1998, 811; Bardhan and Udry 1999, 37). Thus, it is not surprising that an individual’s attributes, such as level education or age, do not provide a complete explanation of the marked differences in current female wages in the labour markets covered by the Mpumalanga survey.

For the Mpumalanga sample, the relationship between daily wages on the one hand and, on the other hand, education and years of work experience was examined for:

(a) all the current workers in any occupation;
(b) female workers in any occupation;
(c) agricultural workers;
(d) female agricultural workers; and
(e) females working in the least-skilled agricultural field jobs.

The scatter diagrams, bivariate and partial correlations and non-linear estimates suggest that the relationship between education/work experience and the current daily wages of all current workers (a) is by no means clear. However, these statistical tests did suggest that there is a weak positive relationship between years of work experience and wages for female workers (b) and a (weaker) positive

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62 Survey evidence from Uttar Pradesh does not corroborate the notion of a uniform prevailing wage rate for agricultural labourers, suggested by the Indian studies that use game theory (Srivastava 1997, 50).

63 For further criticism of the standard econometric analyses of wage determination in rural labour markets, see Johnston (1997). For criticisms of neo-classical analyses of the alleged negative relationship between levels of agricultural wages and employment in South Africa, see Sender (1994) and Standing et al. (1996, 264 and ch. 6).
relationship between years of completed education and the wages of these workers. For agricultural workers (c) and in particular female agricultural workers (d), the positive relationship between wages and work experience emerges quite strongly, but years of education do not appear to have a clear effect on wages, suggesting that the positive effect of education on wages may be confined to non-agricultural sectors of employment. The results for female agricultural workers in the least-skilled field jobs (e) were similar to those for (d). It is possible to conclude that there may be some relationship between female wages and work experience as well as education, but the nature and strength of this relationship varies between different sub-segments of the labour market and requires further investigation.

Of course, it would be possible to add some additional characteristics of female agricultural workers in an ad hoc attempt to discover wage functions that fit the Mpumalanga data more closely, for instance by including age, access to land and proxies for worker's health status. However, such attempts have failed to uncover a statistically significant relationship between the wages of female agricultural labourers and worker attributes in much larger samples elsewhere (Datt 1996, 67). An intuitively simpler approach to investigating the determinants of agricultural wage differentials is to inspect the data for the upper and lower ends of the distribution of female wages in agriculture. Then, a reasonably convincing explanation of the gap between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ paid women does begin to emerge, especially if one focuses the analysis on the top and bottom quintiles of the distribution of current wages for both the least-skilled field jobs (e) and all agricultural jobs (d). The conclusion of this analysis is that employers’ discriminatory and divisive strategies, as well as the role of the state, play a more important role than the supply-side attributes of individual workers or the demand-side variables conventionally used by most economists.

Work experience appears to be quite important in explaining the difference in wages received by the highest and lowest paid quintiles of female workers. The highest paid fieldworkers, non-fieldworkers and all female workers all have at least three times more work experience, on average, than their lower-paid counterparts. However, the average level of education of all female workers is low. For example, the highest paid fieldworkers had only a mean of 2.85 years of completed education, not significantly different (statistically) from the mean of 2.34 years of the lowest paid workers. The gap between the mean number of years of schooling completed by the highest paid non-fieldworker females and the mean achieved by non-fieldworker females in the lowest paid quintiles is larger, amounting to a difference of 1.3 years. However, the mean for the highest paid quintile of all female workers is still low (3.28 years of completed education), and more than a third of these relatively highly paid women have never attended school. In fact a rather high proportion of the best paid women (43 per cent) are illiterate and an even higher proportion did not complete primary school (83 per

64 The suggestion that ‘command over land could strengthen rural women’s bargaining power’ and, therefore, their returns from wage employment, is the central proposition in Agarwal (1997). However, Agarwal provides no convincing evidence linking differences in female agricultural wage rates to differences in their control over land.
Women’s Struggle to Escape Rural Poverty in South Africa

The complexity of the effects of education on women’s performance in the agricultural labour market needs to be explored in more detail. The first step in this exploration is to classify female workers into different types of employee, distinguishing between migrant Mozambican female workers and ‘local’ South African workers. The survey area borders Mozambique and there has been a long history of officially channelled and ‘clandestine’ migration into South Africa destined for agricultural wage employment (Posel 1991, 137; Jeeves and Crush 1997). Inflows into the rural border area of the former Gazankulu homeland covered by the Mpumalanga survey accelerated from 1984 onwards during the war, with the result that Mozambicans probably account for over a quarter of the population of the survey area (Tollman et al. 1995, 4).65

The sample of current female workers was designed to be drawn from the employees of several different types of agricultural enterprise. The three most important categories of employer were: (a) enterprises owned, or partially owned by the local state, referred to as ‘Projects’;66 (b) enterprises owned by ‘White’ farmers; and (c) smaller enterprises owned by ‘Black’ farmers. A total of 532 women in the sample were currently employed as workers on all of these enterprises, of which 179 can be described as non-Mozambicans employed on ‘Projects’.67 It was not possible to identify any of the ‘Project’ employees as Mozambicans. The best-paid women, i.e. women in the highest paid quintile, are not Mozambican migrant workers. Moreover, if a non-Mozambican woman fails to find employment on a ‘Project’, she will also not earn high wages as a fieldworker, and is very unlikely to be in the highest quintile of the distribution of wages in any other occupation.

The wage rates offered to non-Mozambicans are lower outside the ‘Projects’, and the best of these wage rates are not paid by ‘Black’ farmers. Although similar daily wage rates are offered outside the Projects, by many of the ‘White’ farms and by the smaller ‘Black’ owned enterprises, ‘White’ farms are able to offer a much greater number of days of employment per year and far more regular employment.68 The mean wage rate for Mozambican female workers was only

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65 The majority of the migrants arrived between 1985 and 1989, but more ‘female-headed’ than ‘male-headed’ households arrived in the early 1990s (Dolan 1997, 13, 18). There is some evidence to suggest an increase in the employment of non-South Africans on South African farms in the 1990s (Crush 1999). However, farmer’s reliance on female Mozambican migrant labour dates back to at least the 1930s; farmers tended to employ migrant female (and prison) labour because they did not have to compete with the mines for this type of labour (Duncan 1991; Murray 1997). The Mozambican Labour Office estimated that there were 20,000 Mozambicans working on farms in Mpumalanga in 1995, but this is almost certainly an underestimate (Crush 1997, 8).

66 These included citrus plantations (Champagne), coffee plantations (Zoeknog); forestry plantations (Salique); and irrigation projects growing tomatoes and vegetables.

67 The workers on the ‘Projects’ were either permanent employees (139 workers) or employees without a permanent contract (40 workers). They are described as ‘non-Mozambicans’ in this article, despite the fact they may well belong to families with roots in Mozambique, because they do not consider themselves to be Mozambicans and are not identified as Mozambicans by others.

68 Detailed comparisons of working conditions and wages on different types of non-Project farm are available from the author.
about 70 per cent of the rate received by non-Mozambicans working outside the 'Projects'. It is possible that Mozambicans fail to find more remunerative forms of employment, i.e. non-fieldwork jobs on the highest-paying 'White' farms, because they are hindered in their search for better jobs by their lack of as useful a network of relatives and neighbours as non-Mozambican, local workers.

An analysis of women's responses to the question how they found their jobs suggests that reliance on such networks plays a crucial role in job searches. A significant proportion of workers (about 40 per cent) reported that they found their employment through: recruitment by an existing employee on the farm who was a friend or relative; recruitment by their mother/sister/grandmother/father/husband/neighbour/friend; or because they were born on the farm of their employer. The recruitment process usually relied on some form of insider knowledge, and the poorest women would certainly face difficulties in meeting the transport costs required for an extended search in the 'White' farming areas.

Obtaining employment on farms run under the auspices of the state has several advantages, only some of which are discussed in this article. The mean wages for all 'Project' employees are substantially higher (Rand 21.35 per day) than those for the non-Mozambican employees of all other farm enterprises (6.4 Rand), despite the similar level of education of these two groups of female employees. In fact, 'Project' employees who have never been to school earn very much higher mean wages (Rand 18.84) than the non-Mozambican employees of other enterprises who have never been to school (Rand 5.92). Furthermore, 'Project' workers who completed more than 6 years of schooling do not earn wages significantly greater than those of other female 'Project' employees. All of the non-Mozambican women in the highest paid quintile of fieldworkers were employed on 'Projects', but their levels of education were by no means superior to those of lower-paid workers employed by other enterprises.

However, before rushing to the conclusion that the most successful women in the Mpumalanga labour market have no educational advantages over other women, it is important to disaggregate the data on 'Project' employees. About a quarter of female 'Project' employees are permanent workers on the Zoeknog Coffee Plantation, established by the Lebowa bantustan's Agricultural Corporation in the early 1980s. The mean level of education (1.52 years) of the rather exceptional group of employees working at Zoeknog is less than half the mean attained by all other 'Project' employees. Their low levels of education are accounted for by the fact that permanent employees of Zoeknog are older than all other 'project' workers (mean age=46.3 years) and, therefore, these workers were children during a period when access to schools was much more difficult. It may be concluded that most 'Project' workers, apart from permanent employees

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* Sargeson (1999) shows in detail the substantial benefits of being 'local' when searching for a job, as well as the advantages to employers of access to a cheap, flexible and unorganized pool of 'outsider', poorly connected, migrant labour. In Palanpur, 'The diversity of personal contacts with potential employers may also be a factor [determining] uneven success in entering the casual labour market . . .' (Drèze et al. 1998, 37). For similar findings in South Gujarat, see Bremen (1996, ch. 4) and for the Natal Midlands, in South Africa, see Stavrou (1987).
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at Zoeknog, are more highly educated than the employees, including the non-Mozambican employees, of other enterprises.  

Migrant Mozambican women are not only heavily over-represented in the bottom end of the wage distribution in this survey, it has also been reported that many of them receive no pay at all: ‘A common ploy is for farmers to engage Mozambicans at the beginning of the month and then to call the Prohibited Immigrant Unit (also known as the ‘Maputo Squad’ . . . ) just before pay day. The police then arrest and deport the labourers and the farmer has enjoyed another month of free labour. Alternatively, the farmer will go to a Mozambican settlement, collect Mozambicans and take them to the Department of Home Affairs . . . where the farmer is given Section 41 Passes for the labourers. These passes . . . are kept by the farmer . . . (and) the labourer is effectively in bondage to the farmer, unable to step off his private property for fear of arrest and deportation’ (Dolan 1997, 24). Even those Mozambican women who have been able to attend school and/or are literate are excluded from access to the higher paid jobs. The wages of literate Mozambican women are almost identical to those of illiterate Mozambican women. These results might lead to the conclusion that education will not make a decisive difference to the labour market prospects of Mozambican women. However, such a conclusion is unwarranted. For, if employers wish to maintain a strategy of exploiting and discriminating against Mozambican women, then the relatively low educational status of these women will continue to restrict their bargaining power and facilitate this strategy.

The Mpumalanga survey provides some evidence of the relatively limited bargaining power of Mozambican female employees, who appear to be less able to assert themselves than other women workers. For example, Mozambican females currently employed on ‘White’ farms are far less likely to have participated in strikes, or ‘stayaways’, than the other current female employees on these farms. Also, the ‘local’ female employees withdrew their labour for longer periods than the Mozambicans; 4 per cent of Mozambicans report that they have stayed away for more than one day, compared to over 15 per cent of non-Mozambicans. Only 18 per cent of the Mozambican women currently employed on ‘White’ farms said that they had ever participated in a ‘stayaway’, compared to 30 per cent of the non-Mozambican women currently employed on ‘White’ farms.

70 When the Zoeknog employees are excluded, female workers’ level of education and their level of daily wages are positively correlated (Pearson correlation significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed) for all non-Mozambican current female employees. The correlation is stronger than when Zoeknog employees are included in the calculation, and becomes stronger still, and significant at the 0.01 level, if only non-fieldwork jobs are examined.

71 For some further evidence of discrimination against migrant workers and of the persistence of employers’ strategies of ‘ethnically’ segmenting migrant from local workers, as well as the casual from the permanent labour force, see: Husy (1994); Breman (1996, 92); Rogaly (1996, 15); Bhalla (1997, 16); Crush (1997); Hahamovitch (1997); Johnston (1997); Murray (1997, 87, 90); Eveleth (1999); Sargeson (1999, 221).

72 Literate Mozambican women earned a mean wage of Rand 4.6 per day (median equal to Rand 4.37), compared to illiterate Mozambican women (mean=Rand 4.58; median=Rand 4.18).

73 There is evidence that strikes by members of the South African Agricultural and Plantations Workers Union (SAAPWU) have been successful in achieving significant real wage increases for
Similarly, a low proportion of these Mozambican women claim that they have engaged in a dispute (short of strike action) with their employers because their wages had not been paid in full (23 per cent), compared to non-Mozambicans (36 per cent).74 Female employees on ‘White’ farms are far more likely than the female employees on the ‘Projects’, or on other farms, to have their bargaining power constrained by tied credit arrangements. Thus, 26 per cent of all currently employed unskilled female agricultural workers received credit and/or advance payments from employers, whereas almost 40 per cent of currently employed Mozambican female workers on ‘White’ farms have been involved in tied credit arrangements of this type.

Unfortunately, even the younger generation of Mozambican women (those less than 30 years old) may have difficulties in bargaining with employers; they continue to be poorly educated, both in absolute and relative terms. Almost 60 per cent of these young women in current employment have never been to school, and the mean number of years of education they have received is 1.92 years.75 In contrast, less than 20 per cent of non-Mozambican employees in the same age group have never attended school, and their mean number of years of education is far higher (4.45 years). The children of Mozambicans are far more likely to face delays in starting their schooling than the children of non-Mozambicans. For example, about 27 per cent of all girls in the Mpumalanga survey aged between 8 years and 14 years may be described as ‘delayed starters’, because they failed to attend school or completed only one year at school; a high proportion of girls in the survey whose schooling has been delayed or interrupted are the children of Mozambicans (41 per cent). Inadequate education appears to play an important role, discussed in more detail below, in the reproduction of poverty.

Setting aside the plight of Mozambican women for the moment, the argument so far is that the wages of all other female agricultural workers may be positively influenced, if not linearly determined, by their level of education and

low-paid workers (*Business Day*, 24 December 1996). However, SAAPWU claims that Mozambican workers are actively discouraged from joining the union and that they have had little success in recruiting Mozambicans (Crush 1997, 9; Eveleth 1999). Analysis of strikes in 1989 and 1990 on a farm near to the survey area suggests that the women who organized the strike were those with the longest work experience in commuting to work on the farm from the local ‘homeland’. The employer had been successful in segmenting the female workforce so that the women who did not commute but lived on the farm, many of whom were ‘illegal Mozambicans’, did not participate in the strike (Mather 1991). Further evidence of farmers’ success in preventing Mozambican workers from participating in strikes in Mpumalanga is provided by Mather and Matebula (2000, 29–30). Similarly, Indian employers in Palanpur appear to have taken advantage of the lack of solidarity between Jatab and Muslim agricultural labourers and to have adopted a strategy that effectively prevented the recognition of a common interest among these labourers (Drèze and Sharma 1998, 38).

74 Mozambican women were also rather less likely than other women to claim that they have disagreed with their employer about sexual abuse or harassment on the farms. The gap between the male and female wage paid to Mozambican unskilled agricultural workers on ‘White’ farms is far larger than the gender gap faced by non-Mozambican workers on other types of farm.

75 Of course, the older generation of Mozambican women were even more poorly educated. About 85 per cent of currently employed Mozambican women over the age of 30 had never been to school and the mean number of years of education achieved by this group was 0.73 years.
years of work experience. Therefore, part of an explanation for success in the labour market must involve a discussion of how some women succeed in completing more years at school than others. It will be seen that this explanation, which includes an analysis of women’s childhood and reproductive histories, also helps in understanding some of the factors underlying the length of work experience that women achieve. Teenage pregnancies appear to affect both educational attainment and the time patterns of work experience. A good starting point is to contrast the parental backgrounds of women who have and have not been successful at school.

The Mpumalanga survey data clearly suggest that if a girl’s mother has been to school, it is far more likely that a girl will succeed in attending school for several years. Thus, the mean number of years of school completed by women whose mothers have attended school (8.73 years) is much higher than the mean number of years of school completed by women whose mothers have not attended school (6.09 years). The mothers of women who are in the top third of the distribution of educational attainment have, on average, completed six times more years of schooling than the mothers of women in the bottom third. It appears that many women with a level of education that provides a good basis for successful labour market participation and, therefore, the possibility of escape from the worst forms of deprivation are the daughters of relatively well-educated mothers.

It is possible to speculate about the processes that might underpin the intergenerational transmission of female educational success. The daughters of relatively well-educated women may have been persuaded by their mothers to attend and to remain at school. Perhaps more importantly, their parents may have had sufficient financial resources to fund their daughters’ schooling, to

76 The Pearson correlation between these two variables is significantly and positively correlated at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). For further micro-level evidence on how gender-specific enrolment patterns are intergenerationally persistent and may build on themselves, see Thomas (1994). There is also evidence that points to the existence of an intergenerational effect of child malnutrition, showing that women who were malnourished as children are more likely to give birth to low birth-weight children (Smith and Haddad 1999, 18). In urban Guinea, it has been shown that there is a strong association between mother’s nutritional status and that of their children (Glick and Sahn 1998). It has also been argued that the children of lone mothers in nineteenth-century UK failed to acquire skills and, as a result, only achieved low levels of productivity. Moreover, ‘morbidity and low earning power, as indicated by short stature, of the children of lone mothers will have deleterious effects on their offspring when they in turn become parents’ (Horrell et al. 1998, 108).

77 It should be noted that young females who live in households containing relatively large numbers of children (below the age of 14 years) do not appear to complete fewer years at school than other young females. Economists have suggested that one reason for the failure of females to complete their schooling is the presence of younger siblings in the household and the consequent interruption of female’s schooling by the need for them to become child carers (Bardhan and Udry 1999, 147). The Mpumalanga data do not support this suggestion, any more than they support the assertion that larger rural households are usually the most deprived.

78 It is also possible that educated women are in a stronger position to serve as role models for their daughters, demonstrating the rewards, in terms of a capacity for autonomous behaviour, that education can provide. ‘In general, the literature supports the hypothesis that education enhances women’s knowledge, decision-making power, confidence in inter-acting with the outside world . . . and economic and social self-reliance’ (Jejeebhoy 1998, 178). However, for some evidence showing that the link between female education and autonomy is not consistent or linear, see Jeffery and Basu (1996).
allow them to remain at school and avoid the risky strategy of attempting to obtain cash from males who wish to obtain sexual services from teenage girls.\textsuperscript{79} The latter survival strategy has been well documented in the survey area (Kotzé 1993, 77; Ritchken 1995, 362–3),\textsuperscript{80} while the link between early pregnancies and educational under-achievement emerges clearly in the Mpumalanga survey data, which indicate that an escape from acute poverty is more likely if women can avoid early pregnancy.\textsuperscript{81}

Young women (aged between 15 and 22 years) who have no children are much more likely to have completed primary school and to have attended secondary school than young women who, by the age of 22 years, already have two or more children. The mean number of years of education completed by the childless women in this age group is 6.91 years, compared to only 4.63 years for women in this age group who have two or more children. Most of the young women with two or more children (77.5 per cent) have completed less than 6 years of school, and a quarter of these women have never been to school. In contrast, a reasonable proportion of young women who do not have children (36.5 per cent) have completed more than 8 years at school.\textsuperscript{82}

Women who begin to have children at an early age and bear large numbers of children are also likely to be paid a lower wage, because many of them will have relatively few years of work experience.\textsuperscript{83} By the age of 30, women in the

\textsuperscript{79} The risks of this strategy are illustrated by the fact that about two-thirds of the young mothers in the survey aged between 15 and 19 years do not receive any financial support from the father of their babies. Moreover, young women who report that they have been divorced and/or deserted by men are much more likely to be currently employed in the most menial and unskilled forms of agricultural wage labour than other women in current employment. A strategy of relying on the fathers of children, or on children themselves, for economic support can be more easily rejected by well-educated women. The enhanced ability of relatively highly educated women to control economic resources increases the possibility that they will decide not to rely on children for economic support. For the argument that this is an important pathway through which education affects reproductive behaviour, see Jejeebhoy (1998, 172).

\textsuperscript{80} They describe the often violent context within which such a strategy is adopted: ‘Because the women . . . earn even lower wages than the men, and because fewer women than men are employed, they are forced to compete over the wages of men through sexual liaisons’ (Kotzé 1993, 77). This competition is illustrated as follows: ‘Thoroughly neglected, BM leaves her husband and returns to her father’s home. Being broke and her father unable to care for her, she engages in sexual relations with two men upon their return from work, hoping to gain access to the wages they brought from work. She comes into conflict with another unmarried woman who also starts a relationship with one of the men, RS. BM’s other lover, TS, hears the brawl and comes over to beat RS, but RS drives him off with a knife. Not wanting to lose TS as well, BM follows him home but gets beaten mercilessly’ (Ritchken 1995, 363, citing Kotzé).

\textsuperscript{81} Unfortunately, 21 per cent of the young women aged between 15 and 19 years in the Mpumalanga survey had already had at least one child. The Agincourt survey found that by the age of 19, about 40 per cent of women have at least one child (Tollman et al. 1995, 49). On the social and economic consequences of ‘unpartnered’ adolescent pregnancy in Chile, see Buvinić et al. (1992).

\textsuperscript{82} Note that women who have not had children by the age of 22 years are more likely to be the daughters of educated mothers. Maternal education is obviously not the only explanation of their success in avoiding teenage pregnancy, since 66.1 per cent of their mothers had never attended school. Nevertheless, a much higher percentage (85.4 per cent) of the mothers of young women with two or more children had never attended school.

\textsuperscript{83} There is a significant positive correlation between the total number of months an unskilled worker has been employed in his/her current job and the daily wage (Pearson correlation significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed). Those relatively highly paid women who are employed on ‘Projects’ have
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Mpumalanga survey are already at a disadvantage, in terms of employment experience, compared to men: at this age, women have a median of only 6 years of total work experience, compared to 12 years for men. Older women, for example those over the age of 45 years, have usually had more experience of waged work (a median of 8 years), but those older women who have not had a large number of children have accumulated far more work experience.

The fertility rates for women over the age of 45 years are generally high; the mean number of children born to these women in the Mpumalanga survey is 6.67 (median equals 7.00). However, about 23 per cent of these women have only had four (or fewer) children; and the mean number of years of work experience they achieved was relatively high, 15.53 years. At the other extreme of the childbirth distribution, the 27 per cent of women in this age group who had given birth to more than eight children were only able to achieve 9.18 years of work experience. In general, the women in this age group with the most work experience have fewer children. A comparison was made of the number of children born to women with the most work experience, i.e. those in the top quartile with 16 or more years of work experience, to the number of children born to women with the least work experience, i.e. the bottom quartile with less than 4 years of work experience. The mean number of children born to the former group is 5.54 and the mean number of children born to the latter group is 7.06.

Obviously, some women who have given birth to large numbers of children are compelled to remain in the labour market for long periods, in order to feed their children. Nevertheless, the evidence from the Mpumalanga survey provides some support to the proposition that early pregnancy and bearing a large number of children limit the length of women’s work experience and the wage rates they can command.

To summarize, the disaggregated data presented above help to identify the characteristics of those poor women who have been able to escape from the worst features of rural poverty. They also help to identify the most important barriers blocking escape routes from poverty for the poorest rural women and the policy initiatives that might be effective in removing, or at least lowering, these barriers. The women who have escaped from the most acute forms of poverty earn relatively high wages in very stable employment on large-scale farms that are run under the auspices of the state. Most of these women have completed a relatively large number of years of schooling, as have the more highly paid non-Mozambican female workers on other farms. They have avoided early and too frequent pregnancies and men have not succeeded in preventing held their current jobs for twice as long, on average, as the lower paid ‘non-Project’ workers. In the UK, there is a significant pay differential between women with and without children and the indirect pay penalties of motherhood associated with lost work experience are significant and have been increasing (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999, 556). On the relationship between fertility rates, female participation rates and female wages in Europe, see Di Tommaso (1999).

If one examines the work experience of currently employed unskilled agricultural workers of all ages, it is also clear that males are likely to have been employed in their current jobs for considerably longer than females – a median of 3 years, as opposed to 2 years.
them from seeking wage employment. Thus, they have more work experience than other women, as well as higher levels of education.

Part of their success stems from the advantages they derived from their parents and, especially, from the fact that their mothers were relatively highly educated. A more detailed account of the origin of these advantages would require an analysis of the specific historical context of this particular area of Southern Africa, where the imposition of colonial and ‘tribal homeland’ borders, as well as the distribution of missionary activity, had a profound effect on the quality and timing of their mothers’ access to education. More successful women also appear to benefit from current employer strategies and state policies that brutally discriminate against their competitors in the unskilled agricultural labour market. Their Mozambican competitors are hindered in their search for more remunerative forms of employment, because these immigrant workers have been unable to build up as useful a network of relatives and neighbours as non-Mozambican, local workers. More importantly, Mozambicans continue to have much less access to education (and other state-supplied resources). As agricultural labourers, they are denied entry to remunerative state employment and their ability to bargain with employers is relatively weak, because of their low levels of education and their uncertain legal status within South Africa.

The government has taken no effective steps to improve the status of Mozambican workers on farms. Five years after the ending of the apartheid regime, a new Immigration Act is still awaited. A briefing paper for the Green Paper on Immigration describes the current situation:

To date, the political transformation in South Africa has made very little difference to the lives of migrants entering South Africa for temporary work or to non-South Africans living in the country and engaged in temporary work. Apartheid era legislation (such as the Aliens Control Act) and bilateral labour agreements continue to constitute the basic administrative structure of migration governance.

The ‘illegal’ status of many temporary workers in South Africa makes them vulnerable in two senses. First, they have no rights and protection under the law. Indeed, the primary aim of existing policy is to identify them, arrest them, and deport them as expeditiously as possible. Second, some employers find this vulnerability and insecurity attractive and are anxious to employ non-South Africans precisely because they will accept wages and working conditions which local workers will not (Crush 1997, 11, 13).

In addition, the government has failed to develop a coherent policy for state-owned agricultural land, which includes the farms on which the Mpumalanga Projects are located. A recent policy statement suggests that this land may well be allocated to ‘suitable emerging black farmers’, but does not mention the

85 On the long-run consequences of the uneven geographical distribution of missionary and Bantustan educational efforts in this part of the Eastern Transvaal, see James (1993, ch. 6) and Ritchken (1995). On the relatively poor record of Portuguese colonialism with respect to female education in Mozambique, see Sender (1999, 93) and O’Laughlin (2000).

86 On Mozambicans’ access to electricity, water and health clinics, see Dolan (1997, 21, 26).
implications of such an allocation for women, or the poorest rural households (Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2000). Land redistribution and other rural development policies are being formulated in an ideological context that is extremely unfavourable to the poorest rural women. This context is briefly discussed in the concluding section.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The literature on poverty produced by the international aid bureaucracy and by the consultant economists they employ has recently been expanding very rapidly (DIFID 1999; IFAD 2000; UNDP 2000; World Bank 2000). The ideological impact of this literature on technocrats within developing countries, whose work on poverty is usually financed by aid donors, should not be underestimated and has certainly been very significant in South Africa. However, the policy conclusions reached by these documents, as well as the rural development and poverty strategies currently discussed in South Africa, are flawed. They lack a theoretical and historical understanding of how the poor may be affected by the process of capitalist development. If large numbers of poor people are to defend their standards of living, or even to escape from poverty, then a more realistic discussion of strategies to support their struggles is urgently required. Unfortunately, if one examines the detailed content of the chorus of proposals in the South African and international literature to ‘empower’ the rural poor, or to promote the ‘participation’ of their representatives in investment policy decisions, they appear to have no relevance at all to the poorest South Africans described in this article.

For example, the UNDP proposes ‘an effort to empower the poor to participate more in the development of their communities’, through a focus on ‘building community organizations’. These should, at first, consist of ‘small self-help groups’. The recommendation is, at a later stage, to ‘combine these into larger area-based institutions to exert influence with local government or the private sector. The most successful community organizations tend to be broad-based – including both the poor and the non-poor’. The strategy involves funding ‘small community managed projects, such as building water tanks in villages, repairing school buildings . . .’ (UNDP 2000, 12–13, 67). Similarly, the Department for International Development’s strategy for achieving ‘increased economic well-being for poor people’ states that:

Poor people need to be empowered in their capacity to interact with other private sector agents . . . as well as with public service deliverers . . . Successful interventions for empowerment include participation, democratisation and decentralisation . . . support should be provided to develop civil society organisation, including the media (DIFID 1999, 27–8).

87 Of course, a more coherent analysis of policies to promote economic growth, or capitalist accumulation, is also necessary. For criticisms of the current international consensus on the determinants of growth in African economies, see Sender (1999). Criticisms of the South African government’s economic growth, as opposed to its poverty strategy, are contained in Standing et al. (1996), and in Weeks (1999).
The World Bank pushes the same line. The interventions it recommends in support of rural 'communities and civil society organizations' cover much the same ground as those noted above, with nuances that are hardly significant: Parent Teacher Associations and Community Kitchens are identified as promising candidates for support, in addition to the Water Users Associations favoured by the UNDP (World Bank 2000, chapter 4). In South Africa, the Reconstruction and Development Programme identified an important role for precisely the same types of Non-Governmental Organization and Community Based Organization, while arguing 'There is a need to focus on women’s empowerment . . .'. They advocated capacity building for women’s groups, which 'should be well-represented in community development forums and in local government coordinating committees . . . '. Their Policy for Women’s Empowerment included the patronizing aim to 'Provide opportunities for women to participate fully and actively in society' (RDP 1995, 35–6). None of this literature ever mentions the specific organizations, the legislation or the institutions that have historically been most significant in defending the human rights and living standards of the poor in capitalist labour markets. For example, Trade Unions and initiatives to promote their influence are conspicuously absent in the world of the ideologues of 'participation'.

In the currently fashionable theoretical framework, the poor are self-employed 'agents', playing maximizing games in imperfect rural markets. They simply need additional ‘assets’, purchased through access to micro-credit provided by more perfectly functioning rural financial markets, to smooth the process of their transition into membership of the petty bourgeoisie (IFAD 2000, Part B, Paper 1). They cannot be identified precisely as women who will continue to be forced to depend on earnings in the wage labour market as casual/seasonal farm labourers or domestic servants. Therefore, the issue of wages and working conditions and the interventions required to improve them does not arise and, certainly, will not be given priority in research or policy formulation. All manner of ineffective, small-scale and corrupt decentralized organizations in developing countries – NGOs, CBOs, Group Credit and other financial institutions – are currently the focus of 'capacity building' funding, but any organization that has a realistic prospect of increasing the political and economic bargaining power of the lowest paid wage workers is shunned, or dismissed as potentially ‘market distorting’ and, ipso facto, harmful to the poor. 88

Provided that poverty is sufficiently vaguely defined, so as to include most rural households or women, and there is no analysis of processes of differentiation and the specific, heterogeneous characteristics of the poorest rural women, then the context is set for the neglect of effective interventions. Broad definitions (that include 40–60 per cent of a country’s total population within the ‘poor target group’) are the standard result of the representative Living Standards Measurement Surveys and the developing Country Poverty Assessments carried

88 This dismissal is logical, if one accepts the premise, denied in this article, that few of the poor are wage-employed.
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out by the World Bank. Of course, official South African definitions of poverty come up with precisely these results (RDP 1994, Table 3; RDP 1995, 8; Hirschowitz et al. 2000, 60). In this context, there will be generous support to, for example, a group of ‘entrepreneurial’ women, married to the largest farmers/businessmen and political brokers in a rural area, to enable them to club together to flood the local market with their basketwork or soft toys. There will, however, be no support for, or even discussion of, the need to allocate resources to support the formation of trade unions by the seasonal agricultural labourers employed by their husbands. Nor will there be support for effective legislation to monitor and enforce the rights of the migrant domestic servants employed by these ‘entrepreneurs’. Indeed, any state intervention that might create ‘an enabling environment’ for more effective struggles by such workers is likely to be rejected, on the grounds that it might compromise the viability of small enterprises. This would harm the poor, since it is assumed that employment in such small-scale enterprises offers a realistic escape route for the poorest women.

This article has provided some evidence to challenge the validity of such an assumption, by showing that employment on larger-scale state or agribusiness farms is the source of far more reliable and secure wage earnings than those available on small-scale farms. The disadvantages of employment on small-scale ‘Black’-owned farms, in terms of the instability and irregularity of such employment, have been noted, although the data available on the substantial gap between female working conditions on the more progressive and dynamic ‘White’-owned farms and on ‘Black’-owned farms in Mpumalanga have not been provided in this article. However, it has been shown that self-employment in agriculture is not a strategy that finds much favour with the poorest rural women, who recognize that improved opportunities for wage employment would offer a more realistic prospect of an escape from poverty.

This article has highlighted the South African government’s failure to address the precarious legal status of Mozambican workers, in arguments that could equally be applied to large numbers of poverty-stricken farm workers who have immigrated from Zimbabwe and Lesotho. It should also be emphasized that successive Ministers of Labour have failed to take advantage of the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act to introduce minimum wages in the sectors of most concern to the poorest South Africans – agriculture and domestic service. In fact, the Minister of Labour issued a determination in December 1999 that significantly reduced the benefits available under the Act to all workers (migrant and non-migrant) in small enterprises (SAIRR 1999), and amendments to both the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act are expected to be finalized in August 2000. It is envisaged that these amendments will take into account the views of Mr Trevor Manuel, the Minister of

90 For the recent harsh treatment of Zimbabwean workers in 1998 on farms in the Northern Province, which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of both the Labour Relations Act and the administration of immigration, see ICFTU (1999, 39).
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Finance, who is reported to have stated that ‘current labour legislation was restricting economic growth . . . legislation, such as that concerning farm workers, had squeezed lower echelons of workers, forcing them into towns. He also said that ‘if we tighten our labour laws more, chances are more people will be squeezed out’’ (SAIRR 2000).

The government has also failed to recognize the urgent need to concentrate education and health expenditures on the poorest young females. Its Rural Development Strategy discussion of ‘new policies for education’ does not mention gender or target females, although the consequences for poverty of the inadequate education of girls have been a major theme of this article, as well as a great deal of other empirical work. In a context of widespread teenage pregnancy and appalling HIV sero-prevalence rates, the government’s record with regard to allocating resources towards improving the sexual health and education of poor rural South Africans is widely recognized as having been disastrous (Epstein 2000).

Finally, it is hard to believe that the recently announced Integrated Programme of Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development will reduce the deprivation suffered by poor rural women, who are not even mentioned in the Final Draft of this Programme. Previous efforts at ‘land reform’ redistributed less than 1 per cent of South African farmland over a period of 6 years, and failed to secure residential land rights, let alone farms, for a significant number of rural women. The new programme of land redistribution is presented in terms of the standard rhetoric of ‘empowerment’, but only aims to concentrate additional resources on a very small group of medium-scale black farmers, for whom grants of Rand 100,000 are proposed (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2000; Williams 2000). It is hoped that this article has demonstrated the remarkable extent to which the prospects for the employees of these privileged black farmers, as well as those of other farmers in South Africa, have been ignored when the South African Government and the development lobby debate poverty and allocate resources.

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